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strength to this view. It reads: “l o r  further direction to Trustees of 
am trust that may be established . . . If the testatrix had intended 
her wish for the establishment of an educational foundation to be im ­
perative, she would not have used the word “mav” here. Rather, she 
would have said, “any of the trusts that are established”, or some such 
phraseology.
T h e whole question might have been resolved bv a consideration 
of the effect of the opening sentence of clause 10: “All the rest, residue 
and remainder of my Estate I do direct shall be given and applied for 
charitable, religious, educational or philanthropic purposes.” T his direc­
tion is obviously void for uncertainty, which means that all the residue 
must fall to be distributed as on intestacy. Any consideration of the 
further provisions, dealing with the administration of this trust, cannot 
affect the overriding intention of the testatrix as evidenced in the above- 
quoted passage. T n e  result of this view would be that all the residue 
would go to tne next-of-kin, notwithstanding the true intention of M rs. 
Loggie to have the bulk of her property devoted to charity. It is subm it­
ted, however, that the rules which guide the courts in cases of this 
nature have been formulated for a purpose, and much mischief could 
result from a relaxation of them.
T . B. Drummie, III Law U . N . B .
M U N IC IP A L IT Y  O F  T H E  C IT Y  AN D  C O U N T Y  O F  
SA IN T JO H N  v. T A Y L O R 1 
Landlord and Tenant Act — Summary Proceedings for Non-Payment 
of Rent — Receipt of Rent After Demand Served 011 
Tenant — Effect on Proceedings
T h e  Municipality of the C ity and County of Saint John let prem­
ises to a tenant who failed to pay the monthly rental of $37 required 
by the lease. He did make sporadic payments. Landlord commenced 
summary proceedings for non-payment of rent under s. 65 of the Land­
lord ana T enant A ct2 by serving upon the tenant a demand for pay­
m ent of the rent amounting to $588 or delivery of possession. T h e  
C ourt found that the landlord had met all the requirements of s. 65(1).
1. Saint Jo h n  County Court (Keirstead Co. Ct. J . )  Unreported. August 24, 1953.
2. R .S .N .B., 1952, c. 126. In 1937 the tw entieth annual meeting of the Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform ity of Legislation in Canada approved a revised Landlord 
and Tenant Act. «Report. Proceedings of the Tw entieth Annual Meeting, p. 16. The 
revised draft appears at pp. 72-101.1 The statute was passed by the Legislative 
Assembly of New Brunsw ick in 1938 with certain modifications in s. 35 respecting 
property liable to dist-ess. (Stats, of N. B ., 193S. c. 42> Parts II and III of the 
Uniform Act received only minor alterations before enactm ent in this Province and 
appear in the latest revision. 'R eport, Proceedings of the Tw entieth Annual M eet­
ing, at pp. 94-981 Farts II and III respectively of the Landlord and Tenant Act pro­
vide summary m ethod; for a landlord to obtain redress against an overholding 
tenant and one whose rent is in arrears. P art III of the Uniform Act is substan­
tially the same as ss. 65 to 67 of the New Brunsw ick Act (Ib id.,  at p. 97; R .S .N .B., 
1952, c. 1261 and its source was ss. 78 and 79 of the Manitoba Landlord and T enant 
Act of 1931 (Report, Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting, p. 64. See 
R.S.M ., 1940, c. 112, ss. 78-79. Sim ilar procedure enacted in British  Columbia by the 
Overholding Tenants Act, 1895, c. 53, s. 13. See R .S .B .C ., 1948, c. 174. ss. 29-30).
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T h e  cvitlcnce adduced showed that after the demand had been served 
upon the tenant, two payments of $20 each had been made on the rent 
in arrears as set out in the demand. Held, bv Kcirstcad C o. C t. J., that 
once the demand is made on the tenant, the landlord should not ac­
cept pavmcnts ou the arrears demanded; that if he does accept pay­
m ents he nullifies his demand and cannot continue proceedings for 
possession.
Part III  of the Landlord and T enant Act3 designates a procedure 
which the landlord may follow should his tenant fall in arrears. Under 
s. 65 an order for possession may be obtained once the rent is in arrcar 
for seven da\s, but before proceedings can be com m cnccd in the C ou n­
tv C ou it a demand must be served calling upon the tenant “to pav 
the rent or deliver up the premises demised” . T h e  Order itself grants 
possession and orders the sheriff “ to make the rent in arrears” .1 T h e 
effect of this decision is that the acceptance of rent on the demand 
amounts to a waiver bv the landlord of his right to pursue proceedings 
for possession under Part 111.
At common law, forfeiture for non-payment of rent cannot be en­
forced unless a formal demand has been made of the rent. T h e  rules 
governing the demand are strict.3 Moreover, the landlord, without a 
formal demand for rent, is not only barred from re-entering, he also 
cannot bring an action to rccovcr possession: the failure to demand 
rent is fatal to an action for rccovcry of possession.0 These stringencies 
can be obviated bv a proviso in the lease dispensing with a formal de­
mand. In New Brunswick, the landlord has a statutory right of re­
entry without a formal demand.7 Forfeiture may be waived or the 
right to forfeit exercised by the landlord by the performance of an 
unequivocal act. T h e  landlord’s right of re-entry for non-payment of 
rent does not terminate the lease; rather, there is a subsisting landlord- 
tcnant relationship until the former indicates by his action an intention 
to end it. T h e  ways in which election to forfeit may be made were 
noted by Robertson C .J.O . in Prudential Insurance C o. of America v. 
M cLean:"
I lie right that a landlord has under s. 17 of the Landlord and T en an t 
Act'-» is a right to re enter. T h is  right can he exeicised only by an actual 
re-entry, or by the issue of a writ, or taking such a proceeding as the 
present to recover possession.
3. R .S .N .B ., 1952, c. 126, ss. 65 to 67.
4. Order for Possession: Form D.
5. Hill v. K rm p sh a l l  «1849•. 7 CB. 975; 137 E .R  386. The conditions are set out in Foa, 
T he C e n t r a l  Law of Landlord and T rn a n t .  7th Ed., s. 1037, p. 659 et seq.
6. Tom v. Shof«-r 119531 1 D.L.R. 357, per Illsley C .J. at p. 362 This case held that 
there was nothing in the Overholding Tenants’ Act, 1930. i N . S . i , c. 8. as amended, 
to oust the common law requirem ent of a formal demand for rent as a prerequisite 
of proceedings for possession thereunder.
7. Landlord and Tenant Act, R .S .N .B., 1952, c. 126, s. 8: In every lease in writing, un­
less it is otherwise agreed, and in every lease by parol, there shall be implied an 
agreement that if the rent reserved, or any part thereof, shall remain unpaid for 
fifteen days after any of the days on which the same ought to have been paid, 
although no formal demand thereof shall have been made, the landlord may, at 
any time thereafter, into and upon the demised premises, or any part thereof in the 
name of the whole, re-enter and the same have again, re-possess and en joy as of his 
former estate.
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Assuming that the landlord exercises his right of re-entry in one of 
these ways, a situation can arise where rent is accepted from his tenant 
after an election has been made. A distinction must be made between 
the rcccipt of rent due before the right of forfeiture accrues and that 
due after. In the latter ease the landlord waives the right of forfeiture 
and cannot re-enter,10 while in the former, the receipt of rent does not 
operate as a waiver of the right of re-entry.11 In the Bagshaw 
case12 M ulock C . J. Ex. said:
W hen the rent remained overdue for fifteen days (landlord] was entitled  
to two rights: one to recover the arrears of rent and the other to re-enter 
if he elected to exercise it. Acceptance of rent is not, like distraining, an 
affirm ance of the continuance of the relation of landlord and tenant. 
T h e  two rights arc not alternative but independent rights. T h e  satisfac­
tion of one does not satisfy the other.
An example will illustrate the point: R ent is due on June 1st. O n and 
after June 16th L  is entitled to re-enter for non-payment of rent. O n 
June 25th T  tenders and L accepts the rent whicn was due on June 
1st. On July 10th L commences proceedings for possession by virtue of 
his statutory right of re-entry. T h is is an election by him and the 
forfeiture was not waived by the acceptance of the rent, due before the 
forfeiture arose.
In the instant case the am ount paid by the tenant constituted a 
small portion of the rent in arrears and counsel for the landlord con- 
tendea that it should not deprive the M unicipality of its right to pos­
session;13 however, the result of the decision is that the landlord waives 
his right of forfeiture by the acceptance of rent on the demand which 
right accrued on the expiration of seven days from default in rent pay­
m ent. T h is judgment invites comparison of proceedings under this 
Part with that at common law ancl under other statutory provisions. 
Under s. 65 the demand is revived, for should the landlord elect to 
proceed under this section his hand is stayed unless and until he makes 
a demand for rent upon the tenant. From  the terms of the statute 
it would appear that the demand need not be phrased in the terms of 
the formal one at common law with regard to time and amount. B u t 
the demand here is coupled with an alternative, “ to pay up the rent 
or to deliver up the premises demised”, whereas at com m on law he 
only impliedly sought possession, although this was the ob ject behind 
the demand.
8. 119431 3 D.L.R 307, at p. 310. See also R e B a f s h a w  and O 'Connor (1918) 42 O.L.R. 
466, where it was held that the institution of summary proceedings was an u n­
equivocal exercise of the lessor’s option to determine the lease, exercising his right 
of re-entry for non-paym ent of rent overdue for 15 days.
9. R.S.O., 1937, c. 219, s. 17(1». Substantially sim ilar to s. 8 of the New Brunsw ick Act.
10. Price  v. Worwood <1859i. 4 H & N 512; 157 E.R. 941.
11. Re Bagsh aw  and O 'Connor (1918) 42 O.L.R. 466; R am say  v. Hlldred (19301 2 W .W .R. 
692; P rud en tia l  In su ra n ce  Co. of A m e rica  v. M cLean [1943 ] 3 D .L.R. 307.
\2 . 42 O.L.R. at p. 475.
13. It is worth remarking that the landlord had the right to commence proceedings 
under this section seven days after the first monthly rental fell due and w ent 
unpaid. When the m unicipality did institute proceedings nearly sixteen m onths’ 
rent was due.
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The proceedings under this Part may be looked upon as primarily 
for rent or for possession. A summary procedure akin to that in s. 6^ 
was judicially considered in Sherwood v. Lewis.14 T h e  question there, 
however, was whether ccrtain facts constituted a set-off when the land­
lord in his affidavit stated that the tenant had no such right, and, if so, 
did this nullify the proceedings. Lennox C o. C t. }. was of opinion that 
the procedure outlined by the statute was for the purpose of getting 
delivery up of possession of the premises to the landlord and not pri­
marily for the payment of rent, for “providing means to assist a landlord 
in certain circumstances in obtaining possession of his premises from 
defaulting tenants . . . .  it is not an action for rent nor is it a procedure 
by way of distress” .15 If the proceedings arc primarily for possession it 
should be noted that the landlord has an alternative course under Part 
II , for, as W illiam s states: “under the later Acts, it has been held that 
the remedy [summary proceedings against ovcrholding tenants—Part II] 
is available in cases of forfeiture’ (and not only where the term has ex­
pired by lapse of tim e).16 Under Part II a demand to go out of posses­
sion must De made by the landlord before he can proceed against the 
tenant, but lie does not alternatively claim the rent then due.
If the landlord can exercise his statutory' right of re-entry for non­
payment of rent by proceeding under Part II what was the legislative 
intention in having another procedure? Admittedly, under Part II the 
landlord is not seeking alternative remedies: he can only get possession;17 
he cannot claim rent. There is this distinction between Parts II and 
III for under the latter the Order for Possession which the Judge grants 
orders the sheriff to “make the rent in arrears for said premises” .lis It 
is submitted that Part III was meant to deal with the ease of a default­
ing tenant who, if one or two rental payments went unpaid, would pay 
the arrears if prodded with a demand and a court summons,10 or this 
failing, the landlord could swiftly recover possession.
It is submitted that the landlord can accept rent on the demand in 
certain circumstances and not destroy his right to proceed under 
Part I I I . W hen  the landlord commences proceedings under Part III, 
he does not end the tenancy, for if the tenant pays the rent as de­
manded the relationship will continue. Assuming that the tenant 
ignores the demand, then the landlord applies to the Court for an 
Order for Possession (Form D ). By applying to the Court he elects to 
end the lease, for apparently a new right of forfeiture arises (to be dis­
tinguished from the right under s. 8) when the rent remains unpaid for 
seven days. If the landlord accepts rent on the demand which became
14. 11939] 2 W.W.R. 49 (B.C. County Court). The statute under review was the Land­
lord and Tenant Act, R .S .B .C ., 1936, c. 143, ss. 29 and 30.
15. Ibid., at pp. 50-51.
10. Williams. Canadian Law  of Landlord  and T en a n t ,  2nd Ed., 1934. p. 568.
17. Re Bagshaw  and O’Co nnor <1918» 42 O.L.R. 466, at p. 473.
18. Keirstead Co. Ct. J . ,  in the instant case, was uncertain as to the meaning of “do 
m ake” and expressed the opinion that it was not a judgm ent of the court since the 
Act made no such provision.
19. It is to be noted that Part III provides for the relief against forfeiture if the tenant 
pays the rent in arrears and all the costs before the execution of an order for 
possession. See s. 65<5>.
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due after the forfeiture arose, he thereby waives the forfeiture, recog­
nizes the continuance of the tenancy and cannot maintain his pro- 
ccdings for possession; he cannot affirm the lease and at the same 
tim e seek possession. But in the Bagshaw case-0 it was stated that each 
tim e the rent reserved by the lease remained unpaid for fifteen days 
after it should have been paid a new right of forfeiture arose. Thus, 
there can be several rights of forfeiture upon which the landlord can 
rely, and the acceptance of rent by him might not affect all or any of 
them , and so long as he has one right to forfeit lie can act on it and 
accept any rent due before the last right arose.
It is submitted that the position is the same with regard to the 
7-day period if the proceeding:; under Part III  are to be looked upon as 
proceedings for possession. So, in the present case, where the rent was 
$37 per month and the landlord acceptcd two payments of $20 each, if 
it is assumed that these payments were in satisfaction of the first 
m onth’s rent which fell in arrears and part of the second, the landlord 
did not waive the forfeiture because a new right to forfeit arose seven 
days after the third m onth’s rent fell due. In any event, a new right of 
forfeiture accrued fifteen days after the due date of the third m onth’s 
rent and this for the landlord’s benefit unless the position is taken that 
by proceeding under Part III the landlord waives any right he at law 
would acquire by the operation of s. 8.
Franklin O . Leger, III Law LT.N.B.
20. 42 O .L .R . 466.
N IC O L E N E , L T D . v. SIM M O N D S [1953] I All E . R. 822.
Contract — Enforceable Contract — Meaningless Clause — 
Rejection
In delivering his judgment in the case of Hillas and C o. Ltd . v. 
Arcos L td .1 Lorcf W right declared:
Business men often record the most im portant agreements in crude and 
summary fashion; modes of expression sufficient and clear to them in 
the course of their business may appear to those unfam iliar with the 
business far from complete or precise. It is accordingly the duty of the 
Court to construe such documents fairly and broadly, w ithout being too 
astute or subtle in finding defects.
In the case presently under discussion, three judges of the English 
C ourt of Appeal were faced with just such a problem. T h e  plaintiffs 
wrote a letter to defendant offering to buy from him  three thousand 
tons of steel reinforcing bars. A few days later the defendant replied 
by letter, accepting the offer. T h e seller broke his contract ana the
1. (1932), 147 L.T. 503.
